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Abstract 
Recent research has explored the growing ‘financialization’ process in the U.S. and other advanced 
economies. The term is a catch-all phrase used to denote important changes in the structure of non-
financial corporations’ balance sheets, including the growth of income from financial subsidiaries and 
investment as well as growth in the transfer of earnings to financial markets in the forms of interest 
payments, dividend payments and stock buybacks. This paper seeks to empirically explore the relationship 
between financialization in the U.S economy and real investment at the firm level. Using data from a 
sample of non-financial corporations from 1973 to 2003, I find a negative relationship between real 
investment and financialization. First, increased financial investment and increased financial profit 
opportunities may have crowded out real investment by changing the incentives of firm managers and 
directing funds away from real investment. Second, increased payments to the financial markets may have 
impeded real investment by decreasing available internal funds, shortening the planning horizons of the 
firm management, and increasing uncertainty. These two channels can help explain the negative 
relationship I find between investment and financialization.  
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I. Introduction 
‘Financialization’, most broadly understood, refers to the increase in the size and significance of 
financial markets and financial institutions in the modern macroeconomy. The precise form and 
usage of the term have been ambiguous. The phrase has been used to designate such broad, 
interconnected but distinct phenomena as the globalization of financial markets,  the rise of 
financial investment and incomes from such investment1, the growing importance of ‘shareholder 
value’ in economic decisions2 and the changing structure of corporate governance3. 4 While much 
of the literature on financialization focuses on macroeconomic outcomes5, the concept has a 
ready and important analog at the firm level. For the purposes of this study, therefore, I use 
financialization to designate the changes that have taken place in the relationship between the 
non-financial corporate sector and financial markets.  
 
There is certainly strong evidence to suggest that the relationship between the non-financial 
corporate sector and financial markets has become deeper and more complex. Non-financial 
corporations (NFCs) in the U.S. have, over the last twenty years, been increasingly involved in 
investment in financial assets and financial subsidiaries and have derived an increasing share of 
their income from them. At the same time, there has been an increase in financial market 
pressures on NFCs. This is in part due to changes in corporate governance, starting with the 
hostile takeover movement of the 1980s and proceeding to the so-called shareholder revolution 
of the 1990s.6 The same period has therefore also witnessed an increasing transfer of earnings 
from NFCs to financial markets in the forms of interest payments, dividend payments and stock 
buybacks. These developments reflect a change in the objectives of top management, an 
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increasing propensity to short-termism in firm decision making, and/or increases in the cost of 
capital.   
 
In this paper, I seek to explore the effects of increased financialization on the real investment 
decisions of firms. Specifically, I investigate two channels that have been developed in the 
theoretical literature. First, I ask whether increased financial investment and increased financial 
profit opportunities crowd out real investment by changing the incentives of the firm managers 
and directing funds away from real investment. Second, I examine whether increased payments to 
financial markets impede real investment by decreasing available internal funds, shortening the 
planning horizon of the firm’s management, and increasing uncertainty. 
 
I empirically test these two effects on a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1973-2003. 
Econometric tests provide support for the view that financialization has negative effects on firm 
investment behavior. These two channels can help explain the negative relationship I find 
between investment and financialization. I use different sector, industry and size specifications to 
examine the robustness of this conclusion. While most results are robust across these different 
specifications, I identify different effects of financialization on firms from different sectors and 
sizes. For example, while the negative effect of financialization through increased financial payout 
ratios is unambiguous across industries as well as small and large firms, the negative effect of 
increased financial profits is most obvious in large corporations which were arguably more 
involved in financial investments than small corporations. I conclude by discussing the 
implications of these results both for the U.S. economy and for other economies that are moving 
or considering a move towards U.S. style capital markets and corporate governance structures.  
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 This paper therefore contributes to the debates around the effects of financialization on the 
capital accumulation process. There has been much discussion on the relation between 
financialization and real capital accumulation. For example, Crotty (2005) described a form of 
financialization in which NFCs have started to increase their investment in financial assets, 
bought or expanded financial subsidiaries, and shortened their planning horizons. Duménil and 
Lévy (2004a) drew attention to the fact that interest and dividend payments to financial markets 
have been on the rise, and they argued that NFCs are therefore left with smaller amounts of 
funds for real investment. Aglietta and Breton (2001) made the same point and argued that an 
active market for corporate control pushes firms to boost their share price through dividend 
payouts or stock buybacks and, as a consequence, the share of earnings devoted to financing 
growth is reduced. Stockhammer (2004) attempted to empirically trace the link between 
financialization and capital accumulation at the macroeconomic level. He argued that investment 
in financial assets by NFCs indicates a change in management objectives towards adopting 
“rentier preferences,” and he econometrically explored the consequences of this change.   
 
Although there have been analyses about the relationship between real capital accumulation and 
financialization, the contribution of this paper is unique in that it makes use of a firm-level 
database to test these hypotheses for the first time. Previous attempts to assess financialization 
have been limited to aggregate data analyses, which may have prevented the identification of 
cross-firm differences. Firm-level data permits the analysis of the effects and extent of 
financialization on firms of different sizes and in different sectors/industries. Just as importantly, 
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firm-level data makes it possible to analyze the characteristics of large firms, which are most likely 
to be affected by financialization. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized in follows. In the next section I review the theoretical 
literature on the channels through which financialization affects capital accumulation. Then in the 
third section I introduce the theoretical model and the statistical specification to be tested. In the 
fourth and fifth sections I present and discuss the data and summarize the results of the 
econometric investigations.  
 
II. Financialization and Capital Accumulation 
The possibility of a link between financialization and capital accumulation has attracted attention 
in the literature. While NFCs were increasingly involved in investment in financial assets (see 
Figure 1), deriving an increasing share of their income from financial sources (see Figure 2), and 
discharging higher amounts of payments to financial markets (see Figure 3), it is clear that the 
rate of capital accumulation has been relatively low in the era of financialization (see Figure 4).7 
In this section, I discuss these trends and the potential impacts of financialization on capital 
accumulation through a review of the literature on financialization. 
 
There are two main channels through which financialization could hamper real investment. First, 
increased investment in financial assets can have a ‘crowding out’ effect on real investment. Total 
funds available to a firm can either be invested in real assets or used to acquire financial assets. 
When profit opportunities in financial markets are better than those in product markets, this 
creates an incentive to invest more in financial assets and less in real assets. There are two cases 
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to consider. First, if we assume that external funds are limited because of quantitative constraints, 
because additional funds are only available at a higher cost, or because internal funds are ‘safer’ 
than external financing for the firm, then investing more in financial assets crowds out 
investment in real capital. Second, the pressure on firm management to increase returns in the 
short-run can force them to choose financial investments, which provide more rapid returns, as 
opposed to real investments, which provide returns in the medium to long-run. A counter 
argument might be that if the shift in investment spending from real to financial assets is only in 
the short-run, this can add to the firm’s funds in the long-run, and hence could potentially have a 
positive long-run impact on investment. If the firms are investing in financial assets when real 
investment is less profitable, earnings from financial investments could be used to fund real 
investment in the long run. I return to this question after a full discussion of the relationship 
between financialization and capital accumulation and test which of these competing hypotheses 
is consistent with data in the next two chapters.  
 
A second channel through which financialization could undermine real investment is by means of 
pressure on NFCs to increase payments to financial markets in the form of dividends and stock 
buybacks by the firm.8 Of course, if the evolution of financial markets and practices in the era of 
financialization leads to greater debt burdens on NFCs, interest payments will rise as well. The 
increase in the percent of managerial compensation based on stock options has increased NFC 
managers’ incentive to keep stock prices high in the short-run by paying high dividends and 
undertaking large stock buybacks. Simultaneously, the rise of institutional investors, who demand 
constantly rising stock prices, as well as the aftermath of the hostile takeover movement have 
pressured NFC managers to raise the payout ratio. NFC managers are thus motivated by both 
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personal interest and financial market pressure to meet stockholders’ expectations of higher 
payouts via dividends and stock buybacks (a shift in incentives) in the short-run. Both the NFC 
objective function and its constraint set have changed. As a result, the percent of internal funds 
paid to financial markets each year has risen dramatically. This creates three distinct restraints on 
real investment. First, if internal funds are cheaper or safer than external financing, rising 
financial payments would decrease the funds available to finance real investment by reducing 
internal funds. Second, the time-horizon of NFC management has dramatically shortened, 
hampering the funding of long-run investment projects, including research and development. 
Third, since the firm management does not know how much it will cost to re-acquire the 
financial capital it pays back to financial markets each year (i.e. it has no idea what the cost of 
financing for ongoing long-term projects will be next year), uncertainty  rises, making some 
projects with attractive expected gross long-term returns too risky to undertake. All three changes 
are aspects of the shift from ‘patient’ to ‘impatient’ investment financing. I explain each of these 
two channels in turn. 
 
II.1. Expansion of financial investments and incomes  
The increase in the financial investments of NFCs and the resulting increase in their financial 
incomes have distinguished the last couple of decades of the U.S. economy, as noted by, among 
others, Krippner (2005), Stockhammer (2004) and Crotty (2005). I look at these trends in Figures 
1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the ratio of financial assets to real assets for the non-financial corporate 
sector in the U.S. for the years 1952-2003, and Figure 2 presents the financial incomes as a 
percentage of NFC internal funds for the same period. These figures demonstrate that there has 
been a steady rise in the ratio of financial assets of NFCs to their real assets, which was 
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accompanied by a rise in their financial income.9
 
This significant rise in the financial investments and incomes of the NFCs did not get much 
attention in the economics literature except in the works mentioned so far. However, it has often 
been noted by the business press, with cautions on the fragile character of financial earnings for 
the NFCs (Eisinger 2004, Business Week 2005, and Covert and McWilliams 2006). 
 
A potentially contradictory relationship between real and financial investment was identified by 
Tobin (1965). Before the literature on financialization, and even before financialization itself took 
off in the 1980s and 1990s, Tobin noted that financial investment and real investment could be 
substitutes. Available funds can be invested in financial assets or real assets. He argued that in 
times when financial assets offer higher returns than real investment projects, more funds will be 
invested in financial capital and, as a result, less funds will be available for real investments. In 
other words, financial investment will crowd out real investment.  He also noted that at the 
macro level investment in financial assets cannot substitute for investment in real assets by a 
simple reallocation of funds into financial transactions, since no productive resources would be 
diverted from other uses by pure financial transactions at the macro level (Tobin 1997). 
However, Tobin did not elaborate further on any of these assertions.    
 
Binswanger (1999) reasserted the crowding out argument for the current era of financialization 
and noted the high rate of increase in financial investments relative to real investments by NFCs 
in the U.S.. Crotty (2005) describes a similar process, in which NFCs increased their financial 
investments and created or bought financial subsidiaries (or expanded the ones already in 
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existence). He argues that this increase in financial investments was a response by NFCs to the 
low real sector profits and high costs of external funds faced during much of the 1980s and 
1990s.  
 
Stockhammer (2004) notes that higher financial profits together with the changes in corporate 
governance led to a change in the priorities and incentives of management. NFC management 
started adopting the preferences of financial markets, reflected by a focus on short-term returns 
rather than long-term growth, as a result of these institutional changes. This change in the 
managerial preferences had a negative effect on real investment, since NFC management now 
had fewer long-run growth-oriented priorities and instead chose to increase the financial 
investments of their corporations. Financialization pushed NFC management to act more like 
financial market players. Therefore, according to Stockhammer, NFCs’ shift towards financial 
investment can be interpreted as a shift away from the earlier main managerial objectives of long-
term growth through real capital accumulation, which prevailed under the ‘managerial firm’ 
regime up through the 1970s, towards an adoption of institutional investors’ interests in short-
term stock price appreciation since 1980s. 
 
Crotty (2005) adds that since the NFC management’s view of the firm has become increasingly 
dominated by the “portfolio view of the firm,” short-termism has increasingly superseded long-
term growth objectives. This portfolio view of the firm is summarized by Fligstein and 
Markowitz (1990) as the firm being seen as “a bundle of assets to be deployed or redeployed 
depending on the short-run rates of returns that can be earned” (p. 187, quoted in Crotty 2002: 
21).10 This predominance of the portfolio view of the firm by the management as well as by 
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financial markets, together with hostile product market conditions that held the profit rate of real 
assets down, created short-termism on the part of the NFC management that slowed down the 
rate of capital accumulation in the U.S. compared with the earlier periods. 
 
II.2. Increasing financial payout ratios 
Financialization has been characterized by increased financial payout ratios in the form of interest 
payments, dividend payments and stock buybacks. Figure 3 shows the increasing financial 
payouts made by the non-financial corporate sector as a percentage of their before-tax profits. 
This figure shows that, starting in the mid-1970s, total financial payments made by the NFCs 
have been increasing. Although it had its ups and downs, the post-1980 average of total financial 
payments has clearly been above that in the earlier era.  
 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) label this phenomenon as a shift from a ‘retain and reinvest’ 
strategy to a ‘downsize and distribute’ strategy. They argue that management became more 
focused on distributing the revenues of the corporation in ways that raised the company’s stock 
prices and increased the value of stock options. This is the result of institutional changes 
including the prominence of the prioritizing of ‘shareholder value’ together with the rise of 
institutional investors, the alignment of the interests of managers with those of shareholders 
through the use of stock options, and the threat of takeover in the active markets for corporate 
control. 
 
The concept of ‘shareholder value’ finds its origins in the literature which suggests that the main 
function of the firm’s financial structure is to mitigate managerial incentive or principal-agent 
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problems.11 The manager of a firm typically has objectives differing from the objectives and 
interests of its shareholders and creditors. Therefore, the manager should be given incentives that 
make him run the firm in the best interests of investors. The hostile takeover movement of the 
1980s and the following move towards the use of stock options to reward managers were 
employed to this end. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) point out that corporate governance in the 
U.S. changed dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. A hostile takeover movement in the 1980s --
during which time nearly half of all major corporations received a takeover offer-- forced 
managers to adopt the interests of the shareholders (p. 1). And in the 1990s, stock options began 
to play a significant, if not dominant, role in corporate governance (ibid). 
 
Creating ‘shareholder value’ became more important with the rise of institutional investors such 
as mutual funds, pension funds and life insurance companies. Institutional investors have clearly 
become dominant shareholders in large U.S. corporations and are responsible for about three 
quarters of all stock trades (Crotty 2002: 23). This is important because, as Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000) points out, the rise of institutional investors made the takeovers advocated by 
agency theorists possible while giving shareholders increased power to influence the firm 
management so as to increase the yields and market values of the stocks they held.12 The 
characteristics of competition among these institutional investors force them to seek short-term 
capital gains or risk losing against competitors, which is the source of short-termism.13  
 
Duménil and Lévy (2004a) argue that the rate of capital accumulation in the non-financial sector 
closely follows that of the rate of retained profits (the rate of profit after payments of interest and 
dividends). Increased financial payouts in the forms of interest and dividend payments reduce 
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retained profits and so should also diminish the rate of accumulation. Their theoretical argument 
is consistent with data for France and the U.S., where they observe that the rate of capital 
accumulation has slowed down while interest and dividend payments have risen.  
 
Aglietta and Breton (2001) also point out the rise of financial payouts. They study the relationship 
between the developments in financial markets and the investment behavior of NFCs. 
Financialization creates an active market for corporate control, which forces the firms to boost 
their share prices in the face of take-over threats. An active market for corporate control 
increases the influence of majority shareholders. In order to protect themselves and to please the 
shareholders, corporations have to maintain a minimum return on equity, for which they have to 
distribute dividends or buy back their own stocks. As a result, not only is the share of firm funds 
devoted to real investment reduced, but if buybacks are financed by borrowing, then 
corporations may also increase their indebtedness and become more constrained by banks. 
Aglietta and Breton’s (2001) theorization resembles that of Duménil and Lévy (2004a), with an 
added constraint that comes from increased indebtedness. They conclude that the market for 
corporate control can lead to a slowdown in growth by increasing the financial cost of capital, 
imposing constraints on management, and increasing the indebtedness of the firm. As a result, 
increased financial payouts would have an additional indirect effect on investment through an 
increase in the total debt of the firm. 
 
Moreover, Boyer (2000) points out that an increase in the return demanded by financial markets 
would have a negative effect on investment. Even though financialization can ease access to 
financial markets, it can also restrict investment by raising the cost of capital by making it more 
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expensive to raise capital from financial markets. While firms are able to raise capital easily from 
the stock market, the return that they have to provide to the market in the forms of dividends 
and stock buybacks has increased. This is similar to Crotty’s (1990) argument that payments to 
shareholders are a cost of autonomy for the management and hence these payments tend to 
constrain investment. For the management, dividend payments, like interest payments, can be 
considered as a cost of autonomy from financial market constituents. Therefore, the desired rate 
of firm growth must be balanced against the shareholders demands, which could put a constraint 
on the growth objectives.  
 
A counterargument could be that if financial markets are ‘efficient,’ firms should be able to raise 
funds to finance profitable investment opportunities. However, NFCs are in a position in which 
they first transfer a significant part of their earnings to the financial markets and then compete 
with all other borrowers to re-acquire these funds. Recall that Froud et al. (2000) call this ‘coupon 
pool capitalism,’ where the earnings of corporations are returned to financial markets after which 
corporations compete to re-acquire these funds. This process of discharging the earnings to the 
financial markets and then competing to re-acquire them increases the degree of uncertainty and 
shortens the planning horizon for investment funding. Therefore, unlike the earlier era of ‘retain 
and reinvest’, managers now cannot be sure of the amount of these funds they will be able to re-
acquire and at what cost. This could especially hamper investments that have longer periods of 
gestation by creating uncertainty about the ability of the firm to finance the projects in the 
coming years. The pressure to provide high short-term returns to shareholders can shorten 
planning horizons, as the attempt to meet the short-term expectations of the financial markets, 
rather than investment in long-term growth of the firm, becomes the primary objective. 
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 Increasing financial payout ratios have also been discussed extensively in the business and finance 
literature. However, the approach in that literature has been to focus on rather minor aspects of 
the phenomena, such as the relationship between various indices of corporate governance, 
dividend payments and stock buybacks, and corporate performance measured by returns on 
equity.14 This literature generally starts from the assumption of efficient financial markets. 
Consequently, the distribution of earnings to the financial markets at increasing rates cannot be 
seen as a factor that could hamper investment, since financial markets with full information 
would allocate firms enough funds to undertake their optimum level of investment.  
 
However, as stressed by Binswanger (1999), financial markets attract short-horizon speculative 
traders since these markets allow for sequential trading and prices react very quickly to a variety 
of information influencing expectations on financial markets. Therefore, prices on financial 
markets tend to be volatile and enable profits (and losses) to be made within very short time 
periods. Managers of NFCs may be forced, or induced via stock options, to take the short 
horizon of financial markets as their guideline for decision-making. If financial markets 
undervalue long-term investments then managers will undervalue them too, as their activities are 
judged and rewarded by the performance of a company’s assets. This may harm the long-run 
performance of companies. As Crotty (2005) argues, there has been a shift in the financialization 
era from ‘patient’ financial markets to ‘impatient’ financial markets.15 While the former regime 
emphasized the pursuit of long-term growth, the latter forces NFCs to pay an increasing share of 
their earnings to financial agents while also changing managerial incentives and shortening their 
planning horizons.16  
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 To sum up, financialization could have negative effects on investment in real assets through two 
channels. First, increased financial investments could have a negative effect by crowding out real 
investment and second, increased payments to financial markets can constrain real investment by 
depleting internal funds, shortening planning horizons, and increasing uncertainty. In the next 
section, I develop an investment model that can be used empirically to test the relation between 
financialization and investment.  
  
III. Model 
III.1. Theoretical Specification 
It is no surprise that the potential effects of financialization on investment have attracted much 
attention since the “pace and pattern of all business investment in fixed capital … are central to 
our understanding of economic activity” (Chirinko 1993: 1875). The growth of an economy 
ultimately depends on the accumulation of physical capital and the technology it employs. 
However, it is not easy to empirically analyze investment as the “estimation of investment 
functions is a tricky and difficult business and the best posture for any of us in that game is one 
of humility” (Eisner 1974: 101). Nevertheless, in this section I specify a simple investment model 
that can account for the potential effects of financialization delineated in the previous section 
while controlling for other determinants of investment. After theoretically motivating the model, 
I use it in the next section to empirically investigate the effects of the increased financial incomes 
and financial payout ratios of NFCs on their investment behavior.  
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There is a voluminous literature that attempts to explain the investment behavior of firms. The 
following discussion is based on the literature that attributes importance to both real and 
financial variables in the determination of investment behavior of firms (see, for example, 
Galbraith 1967, Eichner 1976, Lavoie 1992, Crotty 1990, 1993 and Crotty and Goldstein 1992). 
The traditional literature, surveyed by Chirinko (1993) and Kopcke and Brauman (2001), focuses 
on a variety of issues that have importance in terms of investment. Five variables deserve 
attention in this regard. These are expected profitability, output or sales, the cost of capital and 
interest rates, cash flow or internal funds, and the debt ratio.  
 
In what follows, I propose an investment model that includes both real and financial 
determinants of investment and introduces two financialization variables to account for the 
potential impacts of financialization on capital accumulation. The investment function is 
specified as 
 
I K f K S K D K P K KF/ ( / , / , / , / , / )= π π        (1) 
 
where I is investment; π  is profits; S is sales; D is long-term debt; P is financial payments; 
and  is financial profits; with the following expected signs: π F
 
( / ) /I K Kπ >0  ,  , ( /  , ( /( / ) /I K S K >0 ) /I K D K >< 0 ) /I K P K <0  , ( / ) ,/I K F Kπ <0  
 
Investment is expected to be positively related to the rate of profit and sales, and negatively 
related to two financialization variables, payments to the financial markets and financial profits. 
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The sign of the debt variable will depend on managerial perceptions about the level of safe debt 
as discussed below. The profit and sales variables reflect both supply and demand conditions.17 A 
discussion of these variables follows. 
 
Profitability and demand 
On the real side, the growth opportunities of the firm depend on both demand and supply 
conditions. Profitability and demand are the two related constraints faced by the firm. First, the 
profitability objective is important as, ceteris paribus, firms will undertake investment projects that 
they expect to be profitable. As Kopcke and Brauman (2001) note 
 
all models of investment recognize that businesses intend to profit from their 
investments. Yet, the models express this common theme in distinctive ways as 
they describe the influence of economic conditions on investors’ perceptions of 
future profits and, in turn, on their demand for capital goods (p. 8).  
 
Within the literature, many contributions developed theories of capital accumulation that assign 
significance to profitability.18 Expected profitability is a significant determinant of investment in 
neoclassical, q and options value models as well.19 The framework I adopt here, however, is more 
in line with the literature which explicitly takes into account the fact that investors face ‘true’ 
uncertainty when they make investment decisions.20 Under ‘true’ uncertainty, future profits and 
demand conditions cannot be known, so expectations about future conditions are in large part 
formed on the basis of past performance. Hence, expected profitability is one of the major 
determinants of investment.21 Consequently, past profitability will be an important determinant of 
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investment through the indication it gives about future profitability. Moreover, if internal funds 
are preferred by management to external funds, past levels of profits could affect investment by 
determining the level of internal funds available for investment.  
 
Investment is positively related to the expected future rate of profit on new capital investments. 
Given uncertainty about the future, it is reasonable to assume that the extrapolation of recent 
values of the profit rate on existing capital might be used as a proxy for the expected profit rate 
on new capital. But a problem with this is the fact that if the profit rate is affected by changes in 
the degree of capacity utilization, merely projecting past profit rates will not be a good predictor 
of investment. This is especially true if the degree of capacity utilization is likely to change in the 
future, or if the firm has been operating below full capacity in recent past, in which case a high 
observed profit rate on capital does not imply a high expected profit rate on new capital. To take 
account of this problem, I use sales-to-capital ratio as a proxy for the degree of capacity 
utilization which has no good macro or micro measurement.22  
 
Financial payouts 
Although I have argued above that we should expect a negative coefficient on the financial 
payout variable, this is not the only possible outcome. It could be argued that higher financial 
payments could mean higher future credibility by showing that the firm provides high returns to 
financial markets. A high financial payout ratio could signal profitability and solvency for the firm 
and also meet shareholders’ liquidity preference. This can increase the firm’s future access to 
finance and decrease the cost of finance by increasing the firm’s credit worthiness. This would 
then imply an expectation that high financial payout ratios could be positively correlated with 
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high investment. Nevertheless, an increase in the financial payout ratio in the above model may 
well affect investment in a negative way. The need to increase financial payout ratios indicate that 
firm has to be careful in the short-run since failure to meet these financial payment obligations 
could result in loss of autonomy, a takeover threat, and a fall in the value of stock options. 
Hence, increased financial payout ratios in the short-run make it difficult to undertake investment 
projects that provide returns only in the long-run and in the meantime require continuous 
financing. I will subject these competing theses to econometric analyses below.  
 
Debt ratios 
Debt-to-equity or debt-to-capital ratios have been used in investment models with the idea that 
high levels of debt indicate financial fragility which would have negative effects on the 
investment behavior of the firms. As the debt ratio increases, managers and shareholders incur a 
growing risk of losing control of their firms. The overall indebtedness of the firm reflects the 
long-run financial safety of the firm as higher levels of debt increase the fragility of the firm’s 
balance sheet. Hence, debt-to-equity or debt-to-capital indices measure a firm’s long-term 
financial fragility. The relation between investment and debt should depend on the level of debt 
perceived as safe by the firm’s management and by financial markets. If the level of debt is 
perceived to be above the safe level, then increases in total debt would have a negative effect on 
investment. Conversely, if the level of debt is below the safe level, then it will either have no 
effect or a positive effect through an increase in the funds available for the firm.23 The level of 
safe debt may vary with the size of the firm as well as with attitudes to firm indebtedness. Such 
attitudes may change over time.24 In the height of the hostile takeover movement of the 1980s, 
high debt was considered to be good for the firm because it forced managers to be efficient, thus 
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minimizing the principal-agent problem, while it protected the firm from hostile takeovers. 
Moreover, debt financing of investment creates at least a short-run correlation between debt and 
investment. 
 
Nonetheless, high leverage can also constitute a threat to the autonomy of the firm management. 
Increasing debt indicates higher cash flow commitments by the firm to its creditors. If the future 
income of the firm turns out to be insufficient to meet these commitments, the management 
then faces the risk of losing its decision-making autonomy as well as of the firm going bankrupt.25  
 
Short-termism and financial profits 
The expectation of a negative coefficient for the financial profit variable developed above is 
potentially contentious. For one thing, this expectation is in contrast with the financing constraint 
hypothesis. According to the financing constraint hypothesis, any income, whether from financial 
or real sources, would contribute to the internal funds of the firm and hence its effect on 
investment should be positive.26 If in the future, the profit rate on financial assets falls below the 
profit rate on real assets, firms may use their income from current financial operations to finance 
their future real investment projects. In this case, past financial income can be positively 
correlated with the level of current capital expenditures.  
 
These arguments will be examined econometrically below. Two considerations should be noted. 
First, it is generally considered to be the case that smaller firms are more likely to be financially 
constrained than larger firms. Therefore, a positive effect of financial income on real investment 
for smaller firms can in principle be identified through the use of firm-level data. Second, even 
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though financial income could be treated as any other income, there is no guarantee that it would 
be used to finance real investment. Given the increased pressure on the firms to discharge their 
earnings to the financial markets, financial income might be recycled back to financial markets or 
used to purchase yet more financial assets. 
 
III.2. Statistical Specification 
The model specified above is appropriate for the analysis of the effects of financialization as it 
considers the pursuit of financial security as a significant constraint on managerial decision-
making, and the financialization literature suggests that there have been significant changes in 
terms of the financial security of the firm. Moreover, it accounts for the effects of increasing 
financial investments of the firms through the use of a proxy for financial profits made by the 
firm.   
 
The equation estimated takes the following form: 
 
ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ), , , , ,I K K S K D K P K Kit i t i t i t i t i t
F
i t− − − − −= + + + + +1 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5α α π α α α α π , −1      (2) 
 
where ln is a logarithmic function, α α0... 5  are parameters, the i subscript denotes the firm, and 
the t subscript denotes the time period. 
 
The regression variables are scaled by lagged capital stock to correct for heteroscedasticity, which 
is a common practice in investment studies that use firm-level data.27 Logarithmic forms are used 
to account for potential non-linearities in the relationships between the explanatory variables and 
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the rate of investment. In order to control for the dynamic effects, I include the first lag of the 
investment-to-capital ratio in the regressions below.28
 
The model tests for two effects of financialization –through the  and P variables- on the 
investment behavior of NFCs while controlling for other determinants of investment. Equation 
(2) is tested using firm-level data. The properties of the data set and the sample selection criteria 
are explained in the next section.  
π F
 
IV. Data 
The data that I use come from Standard and Poors’ Compustat annual industrial database. This 
database provides panel data for a large number of firms. The period covered is from 1972 to 
2003, 1972 being the first year when the full set of data items used for this study is reported. The 
period covered by the data set is appropriate for the purposes of this study. As many studies on 
financialization have pointed out, there has been an increase in financial incomes, payments and 
assets in the post-1980 era, while at the same time the rate of capital accumulation has declined 
compared with the earlier post-war period. I include all non-financial firms from the database 
(the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes 6000-6799 are excluded as they refer to financial 
firms). However, in order to provide comparability with other investment studies, which in most 
cases take the manufacturing sector as their sample, I pay specific attention to the manufacturing 
sector (SIC codes 2000-3999). Additionally, the results for the manufacturing sector are 
important since it represents a significant part of the production side of the macro-economy and 
is important in affecting the business cycles. I compare the results with the entire set of non-
manufacturing firms.  
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 Financialization is a complicated process that may affect different corporations in different ways. 
Macroeconomic data, although useful in identifying general trends, fail to pick up the 
heterogeneity in firm behavior. Firm level analysis provides an opportunity to control for firm-
specific effects. The use of data on individual firms has many advantages compared with using 
aggregate time series data. Biases due to aggregation can be avoided. Furthermore, the cross-
sectional variation in panel data increases the precision of parameter estimates while taking the 
heterogeneity across firms into account.29 The possibility to differentiate between large and small 
firms, which have potentially different behaviors, is another advantage of panel data. 
 
The sample is an unbalanced panel, as a firm is not required to have observations for all the years 
in the period. Using a balanced panel sample could introduce certain biases in the sense that only 
firms that have survived for the whole period would be in the sample and I would have to delete 
a significant number of firms just because data were not reported on certain items for some years. 
On the other hand, the coverage of the Compustat database increases over time. One can take 
advantage of the availability of more firms in recent years by utilizing an unbalanced panel. I 
require a firm to have at least 10 years of observations after cleaning the missing observations for 
the regression variables to be included in the sample. In addition, I exclude firms that have had 
permanently negative profit rates for the years they are in the sample. A significant degree of 
heterogeneity among the firms might generate large outliers which can bias the empirical results. 
Firm data usually have large outliers, especially when the variables are expressed in the form of 
ratios (Chirinko et al. 1999).  To eliminate outliers I apply a two-step procedure. In the first step, I 
calculate firm means for each regression variable. Second, I exclude the firms whose means fall in 
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the 1 percent or the 99 percent tail of distribution of the variable in the sample. Following 
Chirinko et al. (1999), I do not delete outliers for the dependent variable to avoid a censored 
regression bias.30
 
Variables used are taken from the Compustat database. I  is capital expenditures (Compustat data 
item 128); K  is net property, plant and equipment (Compustat data item 8); π   is operating income 
(Compustat data item 8); S  is sales (Compustat data item12); P  is the sum of interest expense, cash 
dividends, and purchase of [firm’s own] common and preferred stock (Compustat data items 15, 127 and 
115); D  is long-term debt-total (Compustat data item 9);  is the sum of interest income and equity in 
net earnings (Compustat data items 62 and 55).
π F
31 The size variable used is total assets (Compustat 
data item 6). The nominal values of all the variables are deflated in order to obtain real values. I 
use the price index of investment goods to deflate capital expenditures and capital stock. Other 
variables are deflated by the GNP deflator. Moreover, the regression variables are scaled by the 
capital stock at the beginning of the period in order to correct for heteroscedasticity.  Table 1 
presents summary statistics for the regression variables. It shows that there are large variations 
within and across firms. 
 
V. Econometric Results 
The dynamic investment model in Equation (2) is estimated using the Arellano-Bond 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique. GMM eliminates the potential 
endogeneity problems caused by the inclusion of a lagged value of the independent variable 
among explanatory variables. To eliminate firm fixed effects, explanatory variables are first-
differenced. This accounts for both unobservable time-specific and firm-specific factors such as 
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technology and managerial ability (Ndikumana 1999: 465) that would have an effect on the 
investment behavior of the firm.  
 
Results of the regression analyses are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents results for all 
non-financial firms, for manufacturing firms, and for non-manufacturing firms. Manufacturing 
firms are further divided into durable and non-durable goods producing industries.32 This split 
would potentially account for the effects of business cycles since durables industries are 
considered to be more sensitive to the business cycles. Within these sectors and industries, results 
for subsamples of large and small firms are also reported. Table 3 takes disaggregation by size a 
step further and presents results for five different firm sizes within the manufacturing firms. 
 
Real variables 
I start by examining whether the base variables in the investment model are appropriate for 
explaining investment. In general, the real side variables have the expected signs and for almost 
all specifications have statistical significance. The general specification of the investment function 
seem appropriate to capture the real side variables’ effects on investment and hence provide a 
good base on which the effects of financialization can be tested. The coefficients of the profit 
and sales variables, which are proxies for real constraints, have the expected positive signs for all 
specifications. They are also statistically significant with a few exceptions. The size of the 
coefficient on the sales variable is larger for small firms, both for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms. For the whole sample, we observe a larger size for the coefficient of the 
profit variable in larger firms.  
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In all regressions except for small manufacturing firms we observe a significant dynamic 
component represented by the first lag of the investment to capital ratio. The positive effect is 
larger and statistically more significant for large firms. This is consistent with the argument that 
for large firms, investment projects tend to run over a longer period, and hence high investment 
in the previous year would be associated with high investment in the current year. Overall, the 
first lag of investment to capital ratio is positive and significant for all NFCs as shown in Table 2. 
This effect is statistically significant for the manufacturing sector and within the manufacturing 
sector for both durable and non-durable goods producing industries. The effect remains positive 
for non-manufacturing firms and we also observe significant positive effects of lagged investment 
in smaller firms in the non-manufacturing sector. Table 3 shows the significant effects for large 
manufacturing firms. 
 
Long-term debt 
On the financial side, the long-term debt-to-capital ratio, which is a proxy for the long-term 
financial robustness of the firm, has a negative and statistically significant coefficient when all 
NFCs are considered. This indicates that higher levels of debt constrain investment as it increases 
the financial fragility of the firms. In terms of its statistical significance this term does not 
perform as good as the real variables discussed. An interesting note perhaps is that, as shown in 
Table 3, the long-term debt variable has a positive but small impact on the investment behavior 
of the larger manufacturing firms and is statistically insignificant. In general, high long-term debt-
to-capital ratios do constrain the investment behavior of the firm. The statistical results show that 
as the long-term indebtedness of the firm increases it may have a negative effect on investment.  
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Financial payouts 
Turning back to the focus of this paper, I next examine the results for the two financialization 
variables employed, the financial profit and financial payout ratios. The financial payout variable 
has the negative coefficient predicted by financialization theory and it is statistically significant in 
most subsamples, as Tables 2 and 3 show. When the sample is divided into small and large firms, 
the sign of the coefficient remains unchanged. Further, Table 2 shows that it is robust to 
different industry specifications under the manufacturing sector. In terms of the magnitude of the 
effect, we observe that it approaches to those of sales and profit variables.  
 
On the whole, these results support the hypothesis that increased financial payout ratios can 
impede real investment by allocating funds away from real investment and by shortening the 
planning horizons of the NFCs. This finding is in contrast with the neoclassical investment 
theory, in which it is the expected profitability of investment that drives investment decisions 
and every investment project that is profitable would find funding.  There is no room in 
neoclassical theory for an argument that higher financial payments reduce capital accumulation 
due to a shortage of funds. However, statistical findings presented here support the argument 
that increased financial payout ratios decrease investment by either directing funds away from 
investment or by shortening the managerial planning horizon as firms are either trying to meet 
the short-term return expectations of the financial markets or as the managers are trying to 
increase the short-term value of the firm and hence maximize their returns from stock options. 
 
Financial profits 
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The financial profits variable employed in the regressions provides interesting results that are 
sensitive to firm size. We observe negative and significant coefficients for this variable for large 
firms across different sectors. This provides strong empirical support for the financialization 
hypothesis, which reflects an insight not available from either neoclassical or new-Keynesian 
theories.  
 
Nevertheless, the effect for small firms is positive. This is not entirely surprising. A positive 
coefficient on the financial profits variable would be consistent with liquidity-based investment 
theories or with the financing constraint hypothesis. Income from financial investments can be 
used to finance real investment in the future. However, we observe this only for small firms. 
Given that small firms are not involved in financial investments as much as large firms, their 
financial holdings (and hence the interest income -the main financial income they have- derived 
from these) can be correlated positively with investment if small firms are saving up before 
undertaking large investments, a result predicted by the new-Keynesian theories of investment. 
However, the robust and significant results for large firms suggest that increased financial 
investments by these firms do have a negative effect on real investment. For large firms the 
coefficient of the financial profits variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
for these firms, past financial investment does not support current real investment. This is 
consistent with the argument that increased financial profits reflect a change in the managerial 
preferences towards short-termism and financial investment and hence affect real investment 
adversely. 
 
To sum up, I find strong evidence that financialization has negative effects on firm investment 
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behavior, especially for large firms. The financial payout variable has negative and statistically 
significant coefficients for almost all specifications and the financial income variable has negative 
and significant coefficients for the larger firms. These results provide the first firm-level evidence 
regarding the potential negative effects of financialization on investment. 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
This paper analyzed the potential effects of financialization on the investment behavior of NFCs. 
Financialization has two aspects. On the one side, NFCs increase their financial investments 
relative to their real investments and hence derive an increasing part of their income from 
financial sources. On the other side, NFCs are under increased pressure from the financial 
markets to increase their returns to these markets. Hence, NFCs transfer an increasing part of 
their earnings to financial markets in the forms of dividends and stock buybacks, in addition to 
interest payments.  
 
These two aspects of financialization could have negative effects on real capital accumulation. 
First, increased financial investments can crowd out real investment by directing funds away from 
real investment into financial investment and increased financial profits can change the incentives 
of the firm management regarding investment decisions.  Therefore, the first hypothesis 
developed was that high financial profit opportunities lead to higher financial investment and 
result in a decline in real investment. Second, increased financial payments can decrease the funds 
available for real capital accumulation while the need to increase financial payments can decrease 
the amount of available funds, shorten the managerial planning horizon, and increase uncertainty. 
Hence, the second hypothesis developed was that the demand for increased financial payout 
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ratios leaves firms with fewer funds to invest, as well as a shortening of the planning horizon of 
its management and increasing uncertainty, which leads to lower levels of investment.  
 
The model was tested by using firm-level data. The findings indicate a negative relationship 
between financialization and capital accumulation, especially for large firms. The results support 
the view that financialization has negative implications for firm investment behavior. Although 
the results presented are not necessarily conclusive, they represent a new attempt to examine the 
relationship between financialization and investment at the firm level.  
 
The negative effects of financialization on investment confirm the concern that financialization 
could be slowing down the accumulation of capital. Although the findings do not lend 
themselves to easy policy conclusions, they indicate that overall, the nature of the relationship 
between financial markets and NFCs does not necessarily support productive investment. On the 
contrary, it might be creating impediments.  
 
Moreover, the results would have significant implications for developing countries. Changes in 
financial market and corporate governance structures toward the U.S. system are on the agenda 
in many countries.33 However, a shift towards U.S.-style financial markets and corporate 
governance would not necessarily be in the interest of these countries, especially in terms of 
growth, if this shift was to have negative effects on investment. Therefore, both in order to better 
understand the U.S. economy (and in particular the role of financial markets with respect to 
capital accumulation) and to better assess the impacts of financial market and corporate 
governance reforms in developing countries, more studies of these relationships need to be 
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undertaken.  
 
Furthermore, for a long time economists have been discussing the merits of different financial 
systems.34 Most of the literature has been concerned with comparing U.S. style stock market 
based systems with German and Japanese style bank-based systems. The debates have been 
around the roles of financial systems in providing funding and key services to the corporate 
sector, as well as removing market imperfections. However, the effects of an increase in the size 
and power of the financial sector has not been discussed much in this literature. The arguments 
and findings of this paper have relevance for these debates, as I identify two potential channels 
through which financialization could impede investment in the U.S. economy.  
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Figure 1: Financial Assets as a Percentage of Tangible Assets
Non-financial Corporations, 1952-2003 
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Source: Flow of Funds Table B. 102  
 
Figure 2: Interest and dividend income as a percentage of internal funds
Non-financial Corporations, 1952-2003 
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Figure 4: NFC Net Investment in Nonresidential Fixed Assets (annual percent change) 
Non-financial Corporations, 1952-2003 
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Figure 3: Total Financial Payments as a Percentage of Profits Before Tax
Non-financial Corporations, 1952-2003 
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Total financial payments include interest expenses, dividend payments and stock buybacks.
Sources: Flow of Funds Table F.102 and BEA NIPA Table 7
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Manufacturing firms 
 
 
All non-financial firms 
 
Non-manufacturing firms 
 
Variable       Mean Std. Dev.     Obs.       Mean Std. Dev.     Obs.       Mean Std. Dev.     Obs. 
Investment          
overall 0.281 0.390 N =   19054 0.263 0.370 N =   36356 0.244 0.348 N =   17371 
between  0.159 n =  815  0.164 n = 1573  0.167  n =  759 
within  0.364 T-bar = 23.3  0.339 T-bar = 23.1  0.311 T-bar = 22.8
Profit          
overall 0.424 0.847 N =19051 0.350 0.780 N =36351 0.269 0.997 N =17369 
between  0.464 n =  815  0.447 n = 1573  0.404 n =  759 
within  0.742 T-bar = 23.3  0.669 T-bar = 23.1  0.923 T-bar = 22.8
Sales          
overall 7.148 6.989 N =19054 6.925 9.767 N =36356 6.882 12.985 N =17371 
between  5.534 n =  815  8.307 n = 1573  11.246 n =  759 
within  4.575 T-bar = 23.3  5.809 T-bar = 23.1  7.293 T-bar = 22.8
Long-term debt          
overall 0.793 1.407 N =18214 0.819 1.609 N =34758 0.849 1.774 N =16612 
between  0.857 n =  815  1.056 n = 1573  1.212 n =  759 
within  1.200 T-bar = 22.3  1.322 T-bar = 22.0  1.418 T-bar = 21.8
Financial payouts          
overall 0.264 0.406 N =18659 0.238 0.454 N =35712 0.211 0.498 N =17122 
between  0.214 n =  815  0.250 n = 1573  0.276 n =  759 
within  0.354 T-bar = 22.8  0.392 T-bar = 22.7  0.430 T-bar = 22.5
Financial profits          
overall 0.097 0.234 N =16944 0.083 0.226 N =32068 0.070 0.251 N =15184 
between  0.131 n =  815  0.121 n = 1573  0.122 n =  759 
within  0.195 T-bar = 20.7  0.191 T-bar = 20.3  0.220 T-bar = 20 
 
Note: All variables are deflated by the capital stock.  
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATION RESULTS BY INDUSTRY AND SECTOR 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
(I/K)t
NON-FINANCIAL MANUFACTURING DURABLES  NON-DURABLES  NON-MANUFACTURING  
 All  Large (1) Small (2) All  Large (1) Small (2)  Large (1) Small (2) Large (1) Small (2)  All  Large (1) Small (2)
(I/K)t-1 .134*** .263*** .095*** .103*** .235*** .058 .243*** .068** .345*** .093* .177*** .236*** .104*** 
 (.017) (.052) (.022) (.021) (.060) (.031) (.070) (.024) (.051) (.038) (.027) (.044) (.030) 
(S/K)t-1 .142*** .064*** .155*** .159*** .059*** .175*** .070*** .170*** .041*** .109*** .091*** .031** .082*** 
 (.009) (.008) (.014) (.014) (.009) (.022) (.012) (.020) (.007) (.014) (.008) (.011) (.010) 
(π /K)t-1 .038*** .076*** .049*** .046*** .099*** .058** .086** .046** .056** .019 .011 .079*** .026 
 (.010) (.017) (.012) (.013) (.023) (.020) (.030) (.018) (.017) (.033) (.018) (.023) (.020) 
(P/K)t-1 -.036* -.061*** -.042** -.023 -.070** -.055* -.092* -.037* -.015 -.028 -.061 -.066*** -.084 
 (.016) (.018) (.015) (.016) (.024) (.022) (.043) (.017) (.015) (.018) (.032) (.019) (.064) 
( /K)π F t-1 .055 -.084*** .061 .022 -.098* .028 -.050 .002 -.036 .202* .013 -.010 -.112 
 (.050) (.025) (.071) (.058) (.040) (.084) (.044) (.081) (.057) (.088) (.097) (.027) (.139) 
(D/K)t-1 -.033*** -.013** -.056** -.027* -.012 -.054*** -.018 -.037* .001 -.043*** -.031** -.017 -.031 
 (.009) (.005) (.020) (.012) (.011) (.011) (.015) (.019) (.007) (.009) (.011) (.009) (.023) 
              
Observations 24719 2476 6018 13076 1371 3147 820 4576 551 1978 11718 1143 2836 
Firms 1572 258 594 815 126 319 75 371 51 163 758 131 298 
J 541.80 233.77 465.06 538.37 102.62 28.78 38.07 342.79 16.19 137.59 554.79 103.61 259.71 
Pr>Jn .01 1.00 .45 .01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 
AR(1) -5.12 -6.17 -3.47 -3.96 -5.41 -2.89 -3.42 -3.13 .33 -3.45 -4.88 -3.99 -3.66 
Pr>|m1| .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .74 .00 .00 .00 .00 
AR(2) -1.26 -1.51 -1.56 -1.36 -1.42 -1.50 -2.57 -1.38 -2.39 -.47 -1.54 -.12 -1.23 
Pr>|m2| .21 .13 .12 .17 .16 .13 .01 .17 .02 .64 .12 .90 .22 
 
Estimates are obtained by the Arellano-Bond one-step difference GMM. The instrument set includes all available instruments, beginning from t-2. The coefficients for 
the year fixed effects and for the constant term are not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. J is the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
obtained from two-step estimations. AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond tests of first order and second order autocorrelation in the errors. P-values are reported for 
all tests.  * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. 
(1) A firm is considered large if the size of its total assets is in the upper 10 percent distribution of the total assets for the sample. 
(2) A firm is considered small if the size of its total assets is in the lower 25 percent distribution of the total assets for the sample. 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATION RESULTS BY SIZE FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 
Dependent variable: (I/K)t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(I/K)t-1 .264*** .235*** .233*** .058 .079*** 
 (.065) (.060) (.038) (.031) (.023) 
(S/K)t-1 .051*** .059*** .081*** .175*** .164*** 
 (.008) (.009) (.009) (.022) (.017) 
(π /K)t-1 .107*** .099*** .018 .058** .050** 
 (.032) (.023) (.020) (.020) (.016) 
(P/K)t-1 -.090*** -.070** -.015 -.055 -.032 
 (.026) (.024) (.011) (.034) (.023) 
( /K)π F t-1 -.086*** -.098* -.022 .028 .040 
 (.028) (.040) (.031) (.084) (.072) 
(D/K)t-1 .002 -.012 -.005 -.054*** -.039* 
 (.012) (.011) (.008) (.011) (.017) 
      
Observations 693 1371 3213 3147 6554 
Firms 72 126 271 319 534 
J 32.60 102.62 243.35 28.78 476.58 
Pr>Jn 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .31 
AR(1) -4.02 -5.41 -5.29 -2.89 -3.54 
Pr>|m1| .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
AR(2) .80 -1.42 .25 -1.50 -1.35 
Pr>|m2| .42 .16 .80 .13 .18 
 
Estimates are obtained by the Arellano-Bond one-step difference GMM. The instrument set includes all available instruments, 
beginning from t-2. The coefficients for the year fixed effects and for the constant term are not reported. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. J is the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions obtained from two-step estimations. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond tests of first order and second order autocorrelation in the errors. P-values are reported 
for all tests.  * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. 
(1) Total assets in the upper 5 percent of the distribution 
(2) Total assets in the upper 10 percent of the distribution 
(3) Total assets in the upper 25 percent of the distribution 
(4) Total assets in the lower 25 percent of the distribution 
(5) Total assets in the lower 50 percent of the distribution 
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(OECD 1998: 15). 
13. See Parenteau (2005). 
14. Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) provide a succinct overview of the important contributions in 
this literature. See Allen and Michaely (1995) and Lease et al. (2000) for comprehensive 
reviews of the literature on dividends. Baker et al. (2002) reviews the literature on stock 
buybacks. 
15. Literature on institutional investors note that equity markets dominated by institutional 
investors tend to undervalue firms with good earnings prospects in the long-term but low 
current profitability. This in turn is held to discourage long-term investment or R&D as 
opposed to distribution of dividends (Davis and Steil 2001: 323-5).  
16. According to Crotty (2002), the beginning of the shortening of NFCs’ planning horizons 
can be traced to developments such as the shift to extremely restrictive monetary policy 
undertaken by Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker in the early 1980s, which raised 
real and nominal interest rates. This rise tended to shorten the planning horizon in NFCs 
by shortening the payback period used to evaluate potential investment projects (p. 18). 
17. It is a standard assumption that investment is determined by the cost of capital, which 
essentially includes the price of investment goods, expected rates of return and the tax 
impacts as stressed in a classical article by Jorgenson (1971). Jorgenson’s strong findings 
 39
in favor of cost of capital as a primary determinant of investment is not supported by 
more recent works, including Fazzari et al. (1988). 
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consider expected profitability to be one of the most significant determinants of 
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sales effect.  
23. Another channel through which high debt would have an effect is put forward by 
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The opportunity cost of not repaying the debt will therefore 
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perception of the extent of financial fragility or robustness of the firm in the long-run. 
Also see Crotty and Goldstein (1992: 201) for a similar point of view. Ideally, one would 
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available in the dataset I use, I leave the expected sign on the coefficient of the debt level 
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25. See Crotty and Goldstein (1992) for a thorough discussion on the formation of 
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